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Industry Insights banner: AI, Contractors, and Continuity of Operations, a resilience briefing for public agencies, with a domed capitol.

A public agency can hold a continuity of operations plan, a set of information-technology contracts, and a growing list of artificial-intelligence use cases, and still be unprepared for the moment a contractor, a cloud service, or a model used in a public-facing decision is unavailable or untrustworthy. For state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, as well as for federal executive agencies and public pension systems, that is now a single management problem. Continuity, contractor oversight, and AI governance are often housed in different offices. The public experiences them as one service: either the agency can still perform its essential functions, fairly and safely, or it cannot.

The official federal starting point for agency use of AI has also changed, and that change should be stated accurately. On March 28, 2024, the Office of Management and Budget issued Memorandum M-24-10, Advancing Governance, Innovation, and Risk Management for Agency Use of Artificial Intelligence. On April 3, 2025, OMB issued Memorandum M-25-21, Accelerating Federal Use of AI through Innovation, Governance, and Public Trust, which in its official text "rescinds and replaces" M-24-10. M-24-10 is therefore part of the recent history of federal AI governance. It is not the current OMB memorandum. This article works from M-25-21, from FEMA's Continuity Guidance Circular as whole-community continuity guidance, and from the NIST AI Risk Management Framework as a voluntary method that agencies and their contractors can use together.

Industry Insights banner: When Your Platform Is Someone Else's Critical Service, with a glowing cloud network over mountains.

A technology firm can hold a current service-organization report, a customer contract with an uptime target, and a product roadmap for artificial intelligence, and still be unprepared for the afternoon it becomes someone else's operational incident. For many software, cloud, and SaaS companies, that is the real resilience question. The firm is not only a user of vendors. It is a third party to banks, health systems, utilities, agencies, and other businesses that have already defined the firm's platform as a critical service.

That inversion changes the work. Operational resilience is not only the firm's ability to keep its own operations running. It is the firm's ability to keep the service its customers treat as essential available, recoverable, and understandable when a subprocessor, a region, or a model fails. Third-party risk runs in both directions: the firm must manage its own suppliers, and it must be able to show customers, and in some cases supervisors, that it can be managed as a supplier. AI governance is part of the same promise whenever a model sits in the product or in the pipeline that keeps the product running.

Industry Insights banner: Third-Party Risk and AI Governance in Life Sciences, with a research facility and molecular network.

A life-sciences organization can have validated equipment, approved procedures, and a quality unit and still be unable to release a batch, complete a critical test, or keep a multi-site laboratory network running if a contract manufacturer, a specialized testing lab, a cloud laboratory system, or a model used in development or quality cannot perform. In that moment the problem is not only a supplier-management finding. It is a continuity problem, a quality problem, and, where models are in the path, an AI-governance problem.

Life sciences is not a single regulatory silo. Drug and biological product manufacturers, blood and biologics laboratories, and medical-device firms live under different Food and Drug Administration frameworks, and many also sell or operate in the European Union. This article does not treat those frameworks as interchangeable, and it does not invent client or facility examples. It asks how third-party risk and AI should be governed so that testing, manufacturing, and release can continue when a partner or a model fails.

Industry Insights banner: Supply Chain, Recovery, and AI on the Grid, over a sunrise landscape with power infrastructure.

Energy and water utilities are often asked to show a continuity plan, a cyber program, and a vendor list. The harder question is whether a utility can keep essential service flowing when a supplier, a control-system vendor, or a model used in operations fails. For many organizations those three issues sit under different managers and different regulatory labels, even though they describe the same operating problem.

The official landscape is split, and it is a mistake to blur the split. Applicable users, owners, and operators of the Bulk Electric System are subject to mandatory NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection reliability standards, which the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approves and which include supply-chain and recovery obligations. Community drinking-water systems that serve more than 3,300 people are subject to America's Water Infrastructure Act section 2013, which amended section 1433 of the Safe Drinking Water Act and requires a risk and resilience assessment and an emergency response plan, recertified on a five-year cycle. Wastewater systems are encouraged to plan; they are not required to certify those products to EPA. Public power may fall under CIP, AWIA, both, or neither, depending on registration and on whether the organization also operates a community water system.

This article treats that split as the starting point, then asks how third-party risk and AI used in operations should be governed so that recovery, supply-chain control, and resilience assessments describe the same set of critical dependencies.

Industry Insights banner: Governing Vendors and Clinical AI, a resilience agenda for healthcare, over a mountain valley at dusk.

A health system's continuity plan can name generators, evacuation routes, and clinical documentation and still leave a quieter gap: the electronic health record, the imaging archive, the staffing platform, or a clinical decision tool that is owned, hosted, or updated by someone else. When one of those services fails, the event is not only an information-technology outage. It can become a care-continuity, privacy, and AI-governance event at the same time.

Healthcare already has official requirements that touch this gap, even if they were not written as an "AI and vendor resilience" program. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services emergency preparedness condition of participation for hospitals, at 42 CFR 482.15, requires an all-hazards program, a plan reviewed at least every two years, and exercises at least twice a year. The HIPAA Security Rule requires covered entities and their business associates to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health information, including through a contingency plan. Neither rule is a complete method for governing clinical AI or a complex vendor estate. Both are reasons not to treat those issues as optional.

This article is about that combined agenda: how hospitals and health systems govern contracted services and AI tools so that care can continue when a vendor or a model fails. It is a reading of the official requirements as they now stand, and of the questions leaders should ask of the third parties and models that sit in the path of care.

Industry Insights banner: Third-Party Risk and AI Governance in Financial Services, over a city skyline at sunset, with the OpResONE logo.

Banks and credit unions can keep a complete vendor file and still be unprepared for the afternoon a core processor, a cloud platform, or a model they do not fully control stops supporting a critical service. The useful question for a board is not whether due diligence checklists exist. It is whether the institution can keep important financial services available when those dependencies fail, and whether directors can see that picture in time to challenge it.

Two official developments make that question sharper. In June 2023, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issued the Interagency Guidance on Third-Party Relationships: Risk Management, which remains the current interagency view for the banking organizations those agencies supervise. On September 15, 2026, the same agencies, now joined by the National Credit Union Administration, published proposed replacement guidance and asked for comment by November 16, 2026. Until any final guidance is issued, the 2023 interagency guidance, and for credit unions the NCUA's existing third-party letter, are the documents institutions should work from.

At the same time, institutions are putting artificial intelligence into credit, fraud, operations, and customer service, often through vendors. A model that cannot be explained, tested, or replaced is not only an AI-governance issue. It is a third-party issue and an operational-resilience issue. This article looks at those three questions together, especially for community banks and credit unions.