Most leaders do not need to be persuaded that disruption is coming. They have lived through cloud outages, ransomware attacks on suppliers, staffing shocks, and severe weather that closed sites without warning. The harder question is practical: where do you begin when "operational resilience" seems to touch every function, every system, and every contract at once?
The answer is to start narrow and deliberate. Operational resilience is the ability to keep delivering the services that matter most when something goes wrong, and to stay within limits the organization has decided it can accept. That definition gives you a starting point. You do not begin with every risk, every asset, or every plan. You begin with a short list of services, the harm that would follow if they stopped, and the people accountable for them. Everything else builds from there.
This article sets out a practical sequence for the first twelve months, written for executives and the resilience leaders who support them.
Why This Matters
Resilience has moved from a technical concern to a leadership expectation. In the United Kingdom, the Financial Conduct Authority requires in-scope firms to identify important business services, set impact tolerances, map and test those services, and remain within tolerance under severe but plausible scenarios; the transition period for those rules ended on 31 March 2025. In the United States, the Federal Reserve, OCC, and FDIC published "Sound Practices to Strengthen Operational Resilience" in 2020, a paper aimed at the largest banks that consolidates existing expectations on governance, mapping, third-party risk, scenario analysis, and incident management. In the European Union, the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) has applied to in-scope financial entities since January 2025.
Even if none of those regimes applies to you, they describe where customer, insurer, auditor, and board expectations are heading. Stakeholders increasingly ask a direct question: if a key system, supplier, or site fails tomorrow, can you keep serving us, and how do you know?
An organization that can answer that question clearly is easier to lend to, insure, partner with, and regulate. One that cannot will find the question asked again, usually at a less convenient moment.
The Business Challenge
Most organizations do not start from zero. They have a business continuity program, IT disaster recovery plans, a cyber incident response playbook, a vendor management process, and an enterprise risk register. The challenge is that these were usually built separately, by different teams, against different objectives.
That fragmentation produces familiar symptoms:
- Recovery plans exist for applications and departments, but nobody can say whether a complete customer-facing service would hold together.
- Each team keeps its own inventory of systems, suppliers, and locations, and the inventories disagree.
- Recovery time objectives are set system by system, without reference to how long customers could actually tolerate an outage.
- Exercises test the plan that already exists rather than the scenario most likely to break it.
- Board reporting lists activities completed rather than whether resilience has improved.
When leaders try to fix all of this at once, the effort stalls. Teams spend months building exhaustive inventories that are out of date by the time they are finished. The better approach is to sequence the work so that each step produces something useful on its own and makes the next step easier.
Key Concept: Start from the Outcome, Not the Asset
The central shift in operational resilience is a change in the unit of analysis. Traditional continuity planning asks, "Can we recover this system, this site, or this process?" Operational resilience asks, "Can we continue delivering this service to the people who depend on it, within a level of disruption we have decided is acceptable?"
That shift matters for three reasons.
First, it forces prioritization. An organization may run hundreds of applications and thousands of processes, but only a handful of services would cause serious harm to customers, markets, or the organization itself if they stopped. Focusing there keeps the program proportionate.
Second, it exposes hidden dependencies. A payment service, a patient scheduling service, or an order fulfillment service rarely belongs to a single team. It relies on people, facilities, applications, data, infrastructure, and outside providers that are managed in different places. Looking at the service end to end reveals single points of failure that system-level plans miss.
Third, it changes the conversation with leadership. Instead of debating technical recovery targets, executives decide how much disruption they are willing to accept for each critical service. That decision, often called an impact tolerance, becomes the yardstick for investment, testing, and reporting.
Standards support this way of thinking. ISO 22301 sets requirements for a business continuity management system, including business impact analysis, risk assessment, continuity strategies, and an exercise program. Operational resilience builds on that foundation and connects it to cyber resilience, third-party risk, crisis management, and enterprise risk around the services that matter most.
What Organizations Should Do
The following sequence works for organizations of different sizes and maturity. The timing is indicative; what matters is the order.
1. Name a sponsor and a small working group (first month)
Operational resilience crosses organizational lines, so it needs a senior sponsor who can make decisions across them. Pair that sponsor with a working group drawn from continuity, technology, cyber, risk, procurement, and two or three business service owners. Agree on a short charter: scope, decision rights, and what the board will see and when.
2. Identify a first set of critical services (months one to two)
Ask a simple question: which services, if disrupted, would cause intolerable harm to customers, to market integrity, to safety, or to the organization's viability? Express each one from the customer's point of view ("customers can make payments," "clinicians can access patient records"), not as an internal department name. Start with three to five. A short list that is well understood is more valuable than a long list nobody can test.
3. Set impact tolerances (months two to three)
For each critical service, agree on the maximum tolerable disruption, usually expressed as time, and sometimes as volume, data loss, or number of customers affected. Base the decision on consequences, not on what current systems can achieve. Where today's capability falls short of the tolerance, you have found a gap worth closing. Make sure the tolerance is approved by the accountable executive, not just proposed by a working group.
4. Map what each service depends on (months two to five)
Trace each service end to end: the people and skills, processes, applications, data, infrastructure, facilities, and third parties it relies on. Map to the level of detail needed to find weaknesses, not to document everything. Look especially for concentrations: one provider, one data center, one team, or one person that several services rely on at once.
5. Test against severe but plausible scenarios (months four to nine)
Choose scenarios that stress the dependencies you have mapped: loss of a key supplier, a destructive cyber event, unavailability of a primary site, or a corrupted data set. Ask whether the service could remain within tolerance. Early tests are usually discussion-based; that is acceptable, provided they are honest. Record what worked, what failed, and what was assumed without evidence.
6. Fix, report, and repeat (months six to twelve)
Turn findings into owned, dated remediation actions. Report to the board on three things: which services are critical, whether each can currently stay within tolerance, and what is being done about the gaps. Then expand the scope, add services, deepen mapping, and raise the realism of testing in the next cycle.
Avoid the common first-year traps
Three patterns slow new programs down. The first is mapping without a purpose: teams document every application and supplier before anyone has decided which services matter, so the inventory grows but nothing gets prioritized. The second is setting tolerances to match current capability. If the tolerance for a payment service is set at whatever the systems can recover to today, the program will never reveal a gap, and the board will get false comfort. The third is treating the first test as a pass-or-fail exam. Early exercises are meant to expose weaknesses. A test that finds nothing usually means the scenario was too gentle or the assumptions went unchallenged.
A useful check at the end of the first year is whether you can answer four questions in plain language: Which services are critical? How much disruption can each tolerate? What would most likely push each one past that limit? And what are we doing about it? If the answers fit on a page and the owners agree with them, the foundation is in place.
Leadership Considerations
Executives shape whether a resilience program becomes a capability or a compliance exercise. A few choices make the difference.
Own the tolerances. Setting an impact tolerance is a business decision about acceptable harm. If it is delegated entirely to technical teams, it will drift toward what current systems can deliver rather than what customers need.
Ask for evidence, not assurance. "We have a plan" is not the same as "we tested this scenario and stayed within tolerance." Ask what testing has demonstrated, what it did not cover, and which assumptions remain unproven.
Fund the gaps you find. Mapping and testing will reveal weaknesses. If findings never translate into budget or priority, teams learn that honesty is not rewarded. Expect a small number of material gaps in year one and be ready to act on them.
Keep the program proportionate. Not every organization needs the same depth of mapping or the same testing intensity. Match the effort to the size of the organization, the severity of potential harm, and the expectations of regulators and customers.
Use plain language. Resilience vocabulary can become a barrier. Describe critical services the way customers would, express tolerances in hours or transactions rather than technical codes, and report gaps in terms of who would be affected. When the front line, the technology team, and the board use the same words for the same things, decisions get faster and accountability gets clearer.
Make it part of normal governance. Resilience should appear in strategic planning, change management, procurement decisions, and technology investment, not only in an annual report. A new product launch or a new critical supplier should prompt the question, "What does this do to our critical services?"
How OpResONE Can Help
OpResONE works with leadership teams to start operational resilience programs in a way that is practical and right-sized. We begin with your critical services and the dependencies behind them, help you set tolerances that reflect real business impact, and design exercises that test whether those services can hold up under pressure.
Our advisory work follows a clear sequence: identify what matters most, map the people, processes, technology, facilities, and third parties behind it, define acceptable disruption, test it, and improve. Where you already have continuity, disaster recovery, or cyber programs in place, we help you connect them rather than start over. Where you want your own staff to lead the program, OpResONE delivers PECB training courses, including ISO 22301 and operational resilience courses, as an authorized PECB partner.
Related Resources
- Operational Resilience advisory services
- Scenario Testing & Exercises
- The Executive's Guide to Operational Resilience in 2027
- From Plans to Proven Readiness
- Operational Resilience Readiness Assessment
Start with a Clear First Step
You do not need a perfect program to begin. You need the right first decisions: which services matter most, how much disruption you can accept, and who owns the answer. Schedule a Strategy Call to talk through your priorities and a practical starting sequence for your organization.
Sources
- Financial Conduct Authority, "Operational resilience" (important business services, impact tolerances, severe but plausible scenarios; 31 March 2025 transition deadline)
- FCA, PS21/3 "Building operational resilience"
- Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, OCC, FDIC, "Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen Operational Resilience" (October 30, 2020)
- Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), EUR-Lex
- ISO, "ISO 22301:2019 Security and resilience — Business continuity management systems — Requirements"

